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I. INTRODUCTION
With the dramatic rise in the number of corporate takeovers in the past
decade, courts and commentators have been faced with an ever increasing vari-
ety of new strategies to examine and judge. While some of these practices are
indeed novel, others are merely pockets of antiquity masquerading in modern
clothing. Nowhere is this phenomenon more clearly illustrated than in the case
of the golden parachute contract, 1 and given the popularity these contracts cur-
rently enjoy, they are likely to be a part of corporate America for some time.
Although the golden parachute has received considerable attention, the de-
bate has generated more heat than light. Only recently have the courts had an
opportunity to address the issue squarely.2 While scholars have suggested analy-
ses ranging from the business judgment rule3 to insurance law, 4 the courts have
been unwilling to view the golden parachute in anything but the most tradi-
tional of terms. Although the courts are correct in their instincts, the three ma-
I. One commentator has aptly noted that "incentive compensation plans have long been a staple of more
traditional employment contracts.... [T]he golden parachute is not significantly different from these traditional
forms of compensation." Johnson, Government Regulation of Business: Golden Parachutes Revisited, 23 WAKE
FOREsT L. REv. 121, 123-24 (1988).
2. The most recent cases to confront the golden parachute issue are Worth v. Huntington Baneshares, Inc.,
43 Ohio St. 3d 192, 540 N.E.2d 249 (1989), affg No. 52861 (Ohio Ct. App., 8th Dist., Nov. 25, 1987) and
Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 208 Cal. App. 3d 1250, 256 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1989).
The Worth case is significant because it is the first state supreme court decision to address a pure golden
parachute-a subsequent and supplemental agreement conferring rights as opposed to an initial integrated em-
ployment contract. The court upheld the validity of the golden parachute as applied to the facts of the case, while
denying benefits to the recipient as a result of his lack of good faith in the exercise of the termination clause. See
infra notes 168-213 and accompanying text. Although the court declined to make a broad pronouncement as to
the validity of golden parachutes, Worth's contract was prototypical, and the court's approval of it is a good
indicator of Ohio's benevolence towards such agreements.
The court in Notomas reversed summary judgments that had upheld golden parachutes. Although final deter-
mination must await a new trial, the court's analysis of the contracts at issue is illuminating.
The court first reversed a summary judgment that favored five inside directors who were beneficiaries of the
contracts. Reasoning that they were not disinterested parties, the court declined to extend the business judgment
rule to their acceptance of the parachutes. Natomas, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 1265-66, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
The outside directors were found to have spent insufficient time considering the golden parachutes, thus ne-
cessitating further inquiry into the contracts themselves. The court made four important observations about the
failure of these contracts: I) because they were issued to existing executives after the merger was negotiated, they
failed their essential purpose of attracting management; 2) because the recipients were encouraged to leave, the
contracts failed to ensure continuity of management; 3) the amounts exceeded the three-year lump sum limit
under the Deficit Reduction Act; and 4) the transaction was tainted with self-dealing. The summary judgment
was therefore reversed. Id. at 1269-71, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 714-15. Although the tenor of the court's language
hardly embraces golden parachutes, it nevertheless acknowledges manifold ways in which parachutes may survive
judicial scrutiny.
3. See generally Note, Golden Parachutes and the Business Judgment Rule: Toward a Proper Standard
of Review, 94 YALE UJ. 909 (1985).
4. See generally Note, Golden Parachutes: Untangling the Ripcords, 39 STAN. L. REV. 955 (1987).
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jor cases dealing with these executive termination agreements have used three
separate analyses to arrive at similar conclusions.5
This Note will examine traditional contract analysis and judicial history in
four areas of contract law to demonstrate the theoretical resemblance these ar-
eas bear to golden parachutes. It will be shown that there is little novel about
special termination agreements and that in various forms they have long been
upheld by courts, which have recognized their value to both corporations and
employees. Finally, a test will be proposed for examination of golden parachutes
that is based upon the salient concerns that have been raised regarding other
contracts over the past century.
II. GOLDEN PARACHUTES DESCRIBED
Executive termination agreements, or golden parachutes, are contracts be-
tween corporations and their executive personnel guaranteeing generous sever-
ance benefits in the event of a corporate takeover.6 The benefits include a cash
payment and may also include other fringe benefits, such as insurance,
automobiles, and professional dues.7 While these agreements resemble typical
employment agreements in many respects,8 they contain several unique compo-
nents. Among these are the change-of-control clause and the termination
clause.'
The first of these so-called double triggers is the change-of-control clause,
which defines with specificity the conditions under which the executive may pull
his or her ripcord. 10 The clause specifies the amount of stock, acquisition of
assets, or change in board composition necessary to qualify as a bona fide con-
trol change."" Other factors which may affect the change-of-control clause in-
clude "delisting from a stock exchange, a change of a majority of the board of
directors within a certain time period, the replacement of a top executive, a
breach of the employment contract by the company, or a sale by the corporation
of substantially all its assets."' 2 The basis for this clause has developed under
federal securities laws which, though ambiguous, have through application es-
tablished twenty percent stock ownership as a starting point for determining
when a change of control has occurred."3 Twenty percent is not talismanic, how-
5. The three cases are: Worth v. Huntington Bancshares, Inc., No. 52861 (Ohio Ct. App., 8th Dist., Nov.
25, 1987), affid, 43 Ohio St. 3d 192, 540 N.E.2d 249 (1989); Royal Crown Cos. v. McMahon, 183 Ga. App. 543,
359 S.E.2d 379, cert. denied, 183 Ga. App. 907 (1987); and Koenings v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 126 Wis. 2d
349, 377 N.W.2d 593 (1985).
6. Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 3 n.2 (1985); 2 SHARK REPELLENTS AND GOLDEN
PARACHUTES: A HANDBOOK FOR THE PRACTITIONER 425 (R. Winter, M. Stumpf & G. Hawkins eds. 1988) [here-
inafter SHARK REPELLENTS]; Hood & Benge, Golden Parachute Agreements: Reasonable Compensation or Dis-
guised Bribery?, 53 UMKC L. REV. 199, 200 (1985).
7. Worth v. Huntington Bancshares, Inc., No. 52861, slip op. at 14 (Ohio Ct. App., 8th Dist., Nov. 25,
1987). See Hood & Benge, supra note 6, at 203.
8. Worth, No. 52861, slip op. at 40.
9. Note, supra note 3, at 910.
10. SHARK REPELLENTS, supra note 6, at 427.
11. Worth, No. 52861, slip op. at 41.
12. Comment, Future Executive Bail Outs: Will Golden Parachutes Fill the American Business Skies?, 14
TEX. TECH L. REV. 615, 617 (1983).
13. SHARK REPELLENTS, supra note 6, at 439; Note, supra note 3, at 925.
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ever, because the number and activity of shareholders vary greatly from com-
pany to company. A small corporation with active shareholders may need to
establish fifty-one percent as sufficient to constitute a change of control, while a
large corporation with inactive shareholders may need only fifteen percent. 4
Determining the appropriate percentage of stock ownership to establish a bona
fide change of corporate control, therefore, is a fact-specific question best
viewed along a continuum, with the smallest corporations requiring the largest
percentage of single-entity holdings, and vice versa. This result also obtains
under current tax law, which does not identify the percentage of stock owner-
ship that constitutes a change of control but instead looks to "all the facts and
circumstances.' 5
The second of the double triggers is the termination clause, which focuses
on an event subsequent to the change of control'-either an actual termination
or a diminution of job status or responsibility. 7 Though innocuous at first
glance, the termination clause is in fact an invitation to litigation. Unique to
golden parachutes is the fact that in the case of status diminution (that is, con-
structive termination), it is the employee who determines that such diminution
has taken place, subject only to his or her good faith judgment. As Odysseus to
the Siren's call, courts are irresistably drawn to investigate the circumstances
surrounding constructive termination. Some of the factors the court will ex-
amine include change of the employee's title, reallocation of corporate budget,
expansion or contraction of personnel in relevant divisions, and employee ascer-
tainment of these factors. Indeed, this inquiry has proven crucial in the two
most recent cases.' 8 As with the change-of-control clause, the efficacy of the
agreement depends in part upon the specificity with which the terminating
events are defined,' 9 as well as an examination of the good faith of the
employee. 0
The compensation clause of the golden parachute describes the type and
amount of remuneration provided. 21 Benefits include cash payment, continued
participation in certain noncash benefit plans, retention of pension benefits, and
various stock option or appreciation rights.2 It is not surprising that this area
14. SHARK REPELLENTS, supra note 6, at 445.
15. Hood & Benge, supra note 6, at 216 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 850 (1984)).
16. Worth, No. 52861, slip op. at 41, 54.
17. See Note, supra note 3, at 925-26.
18. In Worth v. Huntington Bancshares, Inc., No. 52861 (Ohio Ct. App., 8th Dist., Nov. 25, 1987), the
court examined Worth's good faith in determining whether he had in fact suffered a diminution in status and
responsibility. "To make a determination 'in good faith,' [Worth was] obliged to make a reasonable effort to
gather reliable facts about [his] status and responsibilities." Id. at 15. It was Worth's lack of reasonable effort
that proved fatal to his claim.
Similarly, in Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 208 Cal. App. 3d 1250, 256 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1989), the court asserted
that the termination clause's dependence on "good reason" as cause for leaving was "so broad as to provide the
executives with a ready justification to terminate their employment and collect the benefits immediately." Id. at
1270, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
19. SHARK REPELLENTS, supra note 6, at 447. In one scenario, an inartfully drafted termination clause
could allow an executive to retain her former position while receiving parachute payments ostensibly predicated on
her departure. See Hood & Benge, supra note 6, at 202 n.13.
20. See Worth, No. 52861, slip op. at 14-29.
21. Id. at 41.
22. SHARK REPELLENTS, supra note 6, at 467.
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has generated the most controversy, with attention focused on the reasonable-
ness of the contract award.23 Yet much of the uncertainty that existed in the
early 1980s as to the judicial treatment that would await parachute payments
has been ameliorated by recent congressional action. 4 The Internal Revenue
Service has limited the amount of such payments to three times an employee's
annual salary before both the employee and the corporation lose certain tax
benefits. 25 The three hundred percent limit, in conjunction with reasonableness
requirements, 2 provides boundaries which enhance certainty as to likely judi-
cial response by allowing corporate compensation committees to use what
amounts to a congressionally approved safe harbor in determining appropriate
contract awards. It is likely that far from discouraging future parachutes,2 7 the
Tax Code will encourage their use. Indeed, in the recent California case Gail-
lard v. Natomas Co.,28 the court found the three hundred percent rule to be of
considerable probative value, noting that any amount beyond that figure would
constitute an excessive payment. 29 Compensation, then, should remain within
the three hundred percent limit, and should reflect the expected magnitude of
loss upon termination, ability to gain new employment, age, transferability of
skills, labor market conditions, work performed, training and experience, results
obtained, and compensation paid by similarly situated businesses.3°
Supporters of golden parachutes argue that, by providing for a safe landing
in the event of a takeover-induced termination, 31 these agreements foster a sense
of management objectivity that ensures that directors will operate to maximize
shareholder interests. 2 Because executive entrenchment is minimized when pe-
cuniary self-preservation is eliminated, current management is free to pursue
with vigor an aggressive negotiating response to a tender offer without fear of
reprisal by the acquiring company.33
Persuasive also is the argument that golden parachutes attract and retain
qualified managers in industries with high displacement risks.34 In an environ-
ment active with corporate takeovers, it has become increasingly difficult to per-
23. See Riger, On Golden Parachutes-Ripcords or Ripoffs? Some Comments on Special Termination
Agreements, 3 PACE L. REV. 15 (1982).
24. See I.R.C. § 280G (1986).
25. Id. §§ 280G, 4999. "Section 280G of the Code restricts the deductibility of parachute payments ... if
[it] exceeds three times the value of a 'base amount,' while section 4999 imposes a twenty percent excise tax on
parachute recipients to the extent that the parachute payment exceeds that 'base amount.'" Johnson, supra note
1, at 129.
26. I.R.C. § 280G(b)(4)(A), (B) (1986). Reasonableness is nowhere defined in the Code, but one commen-
tator suggests that predictive factors include "the work performed, the training and experience involved, the re-
sults obtained, the need for unusual ability and talent, the inadequacy of compensation in prior years, and the
compensation paid by similar businesses for comparable services." Johnson, supra note 1, at 135. See also infra
notes 223-29 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 1, at 129.
28. 208 Cal. App. 3d 1250, 256 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1989).
29. Id. at 1270-71, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
30. Note, supra note 3, at 926; Johnson, supra note 1, at 135.
31. Note, supra note 4, at 958.
32. Id. See Note, Golden Parachutes: Executive Employment Contracts, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1117,
1133 (1983).
33. Note, supra nete 4, at 959.
34. Note, supra note 3, at 914.
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suade qualified executives to accept new positions where job security is ques-
tionable. The problem is especially acute where the company requires much
firm-specific knowledge, with little application to other employers. By indemni-
fying prospective employees from takeover-related discharge, golden parachutes
enable firms not only to attract talented executives, but also to require them to
obtain the degree of specialization the company requires.3 5
Critics have argued that golden parachutes are a waste of corporate assets,
rewarding executives for performing tasks they are legally and ethically bound
to perform as part of their corporate duties.36 Moreover, far from inducing cor-
porate loyalty, it is argued that they enhance disloyalty by encouraging execu-
tives to seek mergers as a way of accelerating the benefits of their contracts.37
Searching for the right trigger, it is further argued, will cause executives to
agree to suboptimal acquisitions.38 Even worse, some commentators speculate,
golden parachutes will create both apathy and recklessness in covered execu-
tives, further harming shareholder interests. 9 Finally, critics contend that the
presence of ego and the absence of fear of post-merger termination encourage
managers to fight takeovers even more ruthlessly, increasing transaction costs
and lowering shareholder profits."0
Although the foregoing arguments are helpful in identifying the areas of
controversy, a lack of empirical support renders them of little predictive or ana-
lytical use. Upon close examination, their appeal is superficial, for they amount
to little more than speculation and second-guessing 1 and are of little help to a
judiciary that seeks objective criteria upon which to base its decisions. Yet an
examination of several lines of traditional contract law will raise and answer
many of the questions that have troubled courts and commentators about
golden parachutes and will provide insights that give workable rules for consis-
tent judicial analysis. This Note will now examine traditional contract law in
light of the recent golden parachute cases and suggestions of commentators.
III. SEVERANCE ANALYSIS
A recent decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals, confronting the validity
of a golden parachute contract, suggested one traditional approach that would
35. Id. at 917.
36. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 126; Riger, supra note 23, at 39. Indeed, it is suggested that executives
are already handsomely rewarded for their services, see Note, supra note 32, at 1122-24, and that such compensa-
tion already reflects the risks inherent in today's merger-filled market. See Hood & Benge, supra note 6, at 204-
05. Additionally, for those executives who are already the lucky recipients of some form of stock option plan,
opponents charge that golden parachutes merely add insult to overcompensated injury. See Note, supra note 32,
at 1126.
37. Note, supra note 4, at 961.
38. Note, supra note 4, at 961, 962.
39. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 126; Comment, supra note 12, at 621.
40. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 126; Comment, supra note 12, at 621.
41. One pair of commentators lamented that "it is difficult, if not impossible, to assess accurately the effect
of golden parachute agreements." Hood & Benge, supra note 6, at 206. In the absence of any empirical study, one
argument is as persuasive as another and cannot by itself further meaningful analysis. See Comment, Testing the
Flight of the Golden Parachute: Judicial Smooth Sailing or Turbulence Ahead?, 11 N. KY. L. REv. 519, 530
(1984).
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provide a conventional analytical framework within which to scrutinize these
termination agreements. In Royal Crown Cos. v. McMahon,42 the court de-
clared that, for purposes of legal analysis, the term "golden parachute" was not
by itself legally significant. 43 The court asserted that "[a] severance contract by
any other name would be just as enforceable." 44 To date, courts and commenta-
tors have not examined golden parachutes in light of the principles supporting
severance contracts. Unfortunately, due to the brevity of the McMahon decision
and its failure to articulate the rationale supporting its pronouncement of the
severance analysis, the opinion sheds little light on the issue and gives little
substance with which to test its validity.
A. Facts of McMahon
McMahon was the president of Arbys, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of
the defendant, Royal Crown Companies (Royal Crown).45 Royal Crown, pursu-
ant to takeover rumors, attempted to induce its staff officers and C.E.O. to re-
main with the company by offering them golden parachutes. 46 The contracts
were offered to allay the fears of top level executives and to reinforce and en-
courage "the continued attention and dedication" of management personnel
without the distractions attendant to a corporate takeover, all purportedly for
the benefit of Royal Crown's shareholders. 47 Prior to the offer of the agreement,
McMahon had no written employment contract-he was terminable at the will
of either party.48 After a subsequent takeover, and pursuant to the terms of his
contract, McMahon voluntarily resigned his position. Royal Crown, however,
denied his payments, and this suit followed.49
B. History of Severance Contracts
The concept of employee severance agreements is not new, with cases dat-
ing back at least as far as 1862.0 Severance agreements have traditionally been
considered offers of a unilateral contract-a submission of an offer in return for
the rendition of services in employment by an employee until the occurrence of
a stipulated event.51 The offer is considered to have been accepted fully if the
42. 183 Ga. App. 543, 359 S.E.2d 379, cert. denied, 183 Ga. App. 907 (1987).
43. Id. at 545, 359 S.E.2d at 381. Accord Worth v. Huntington Bancshares, Inc., 43 Ohio St. 3d 192, 196,
540 N.E.2d 249, 254 (1989).
44. McMahon, 183 Ga. App. at 545, 359 S.E.2d at 381.
45. Id. at 543, 359 S.E.2d at 380.
46. Id. at 543-44, 359 S.E.2d at 380.
47. Id. at 544, 359 S.E.2d at 380.
48. Id. at 543, 359 S.E.2d at 380.
49. Id. at 544, 359 S.E.2d at 380.
50. Lake v. Campbell, 5 L.T.R. 582 (1862), recognized that an amount of money to be received by an
employee, if he remained employed until a certain date, was an amount to be considered in assessing damages for
a wrongful dismissal. In other words, because the damage award could include only money the employee could
claim he had earned, anything denominated as a gift could not be considered in the damage formula. The sever-
ance bonus must, therefore, have been viewed as an earned entitlement and not as a gift.
51. Chinn v. China Nat'l Aviation Corp., 138 Cal. App. 2d 98, 100, 291 P.2d 91, 92 (1955). Essentially the
same observation has been made about golden parachutes. One pair of commentators notes that "[a] golden
parachute agreement is a supplemental employment contract which deviates from the traditional employment
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employee remains in the employ of the employer. 2 Acceptance need not be
specifically communicated to the employer; it is enough that the employee per-
forms his or her duties. The agreement will then arise by implication, provided
the offer has not been withdrawn.53 Viewed as such, severance pay is more than
a mere gratuity to be paid at the will of an employer;5 it is "remuneration for
the service rendered during the period covered by the agreement." 5
As was noted by Labatt in his 1913 treatise,
In some contracts it is stipulated, either absolutely or conditionally, that a sum desig-
nated as a gift, gratuity, or bonus shall be payable at a certain date. Such a sum is in
effect a part of the stipulated remuneration; and when the specified period has expired,
the right to recover it at once accrues to the servant, provided the agreement is valid,
and the specified condition ... has been fulfilled. 6
In an early North Carolina case, Roberts v. Mays Mills,57 the court echoed
Labatt when it held that a bonus offered to employees was not a gratuity, but
was in fact an offer by the employer to produce efficient and faithful service for
a specified period of time.58 When an employee is induced to enter employment
by means of such a bonus, the payment becomes a supplementary contract, dep-
rivation of which cannot be achieved without sufficient cause.5
Without specifically addressing the issue of consideration, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, in Zwolanek v. Baker Manufacturing Co.,60 noted in 1912 that
certain benefits flowed to the offeror as a result of severance contracts. Sever-
ance agreements "tend to relieve the employer of the annoyance of hiring and
breaking in new men to take the place of those who might otherwise voluntarily
quit, and to insure a full working force at times when jobs are plentiful and
labor is scarce."'" By implication, workers covered by such agreements would
be foregoing other employment opportunities in order to preserve their sever-
ance benefits, thus, according to one modern golden parachute case, incurring a
detriment sufficient to support a finding of consideration. 2
Other severance contracts were attacked, much like golden parachutes, on
the grounds that the benefit constituted a payment based on past performance
or pre-existing duty. 3 The objection was that the recipient was already bound
contract in that it provides for substantial severance pay upon the occurrence of certain events specified in the
agreement." Hood & Benge, supra note 6, at 202. At its theoretical core, the golden parachute is much the same
as the severance contract; only the payout differs. See infra text accompanying notes 72-76.
52. Gronlund v. Church & Dwight Co., 514 F. Supp. 1304, 1310 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
53. Zwolanek v. Baker Mfg. Co., 150 Wis. 517, 523, 137 N.W. 769, 772-73 (1912); A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 70, at 115 (one vol. ed. 1952).
54. Chinn, 138 Cal. App. 2d at 100, 291 P.2d at 92.
55. Gronlund, 514 F. Supp. at 1310 (quoting Owens v. Press Publishing Co., 20 N.J. 537, 546, 120 A.2d
442, 446 (1956)).
56. 2 C.B. LABAYT. COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 452 (2d ed. 1913).
57. 184 N.C. 406, 114 S.E. 530 (1922).
58. Id. at 410, 114 S.E. at 532.
59. Id.
60. 150 Wis. 517, 137 N.W. 769 (1912).
61. Id. at 521, 137 N.W. at 772. High turnover is a persistent problem in today's executive market, and it is
apparently on the rise. Note, supra note 32, at 1131-32.
62. Worth v. Huntington Bancshares, Inc., No. 52861, slip op. at 42-45 (Ohio Ct. App., 8th Dist., Nov. 25,
1987).
63. One such case is Plowman v. Indian Ref. Co., 20 F. Supp. 1, 4 (E.D. II. 1937).
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to do his best for his salary, having done nothing in addition that would support
the promise of a bonus. But the court in H.S. Kerbaugh, Inc. v. Gray" rejected
this argument, asserting that "this would be true [only] if the plaintiff were
legally bound to continue in the employment of the defendant."65 Other courts
likewise have dismissed this charge, noting that these contracts were "not based
upon past services, but upon the employee accepting the offer of the contract by
continuing in employment."6 Where no prior obligation existed for an em-
ployee to remain with a company, as in an employment-at-will situation,6 the
only duty the employee would be obliged to fulfill would be performance of job
responsibilities. By remaining with the company in exchange for the severance
bonus, the agreement became a supplemental contract,68 compensating an addi-
tional performance for which no prior duty existed.
Finally, at least one severance contract was attacked for providing an un-
warranted windfall to the worker. In rejecting the argument that an immediate
resignation under one such plan would trigger the same benefits as would a
resignation after many years, the court in Chinn v. China National Aviation
Corp.69 noted that a clear reading of the contract indicated that benefits were
payable based only upon years of service up to the time of termination."' Be-
cause the contract thus guaranteed that the benefit would fairly reflect the con-
sideration tendered, it was not void as a gift unsupported by consideration. 7'
C. Golden Parachutes and Severance Contracts Compared
As an initial matter, it is striking that the rationale advanced by courts
early in this century favoring and opposing severance agreements is so closely
paralleled by courts and commentators today when discussing golden
parachutes. McMahon's golden parachute purported to induce him to remain
with Royal Crown, encouraging his continued dedication to the company.72 The
presumed benefit to the corporation was the preservation of a loyal staff of em-
ployees, saving Royal Crown from "the annoyance of hiring and breaking in
new men to take the place of those who might otherwise voluntarily quit,"73 as
was so aptly noted in 1912 by the Zwolanek court.74 The efficient service em-
ployers sought in exchange for the bonuses offered in 19227, is not dissimilar to
the continued attention and dedication Royal Crown sought from its employees
in 1982.76 Indeed, in the years which have elapsed since Zwolanek and Mays
Mills were decided, courts have consistently upheld severance agreements, cit-
64. 212 F. 716 (2d Cir. 1914).
65. Id. at 717.
66. Chinn v. China Nat'l Aviation Corp., 138 Cal. App. 2d 98, 102, 291 P.2d 91, 94 (1955).
67. E.g., Roberts v. Mays Mills, 184 N.C. 406, 114 S.E. 530 (1922).
68. Id. at 410, 114 S.E. at 532.
69. 138 Cal. App. 2d 98, 291 P.2d 91 (1955).
70. Id. at 103, 291 P.2d at 94.
71. Id.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
73. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
74. Zwolanek v. Baker Mfg. Co., 150 Wis. 2d 517, 521, 137 N.W. 769, 772 (1912).
75. Roberts v. Mays Mills, 184 N.C. 406, 410, 114 S.E. 530, 532 (1922).
76. McMahon, 183 Ga. App. at 543-44, 359 S.E.2d at 380.
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ing with approval the foregoing arguments. It is hardly surprising, then, that
golden parachutes should enjoy such vitality when they purport to do the very
things which for years have basked in the gentle warmth of judicial approval.
As to the issue of consideration, 7 McMahon held that because the contract
was expressly offered to induce McMahon to remain with Royal Crown,
"[c]ontinued performance under a terminable-at-will contract furnish[ed] suffi-
cient consideration for the promise of additional severance pay."78a The holding
strikes a resonant chord with H.S. Kerbaugh, which found a severance contract
to be supported by consideration where the recipient remained at work in ex-
change for the bonus, when he was not otherwise legally bound to do so.79 On
the consideration issue, McMahon is in agreement with a long line of severance
cases.
The most serious charge leveled against golden parachutes has been that
they are an unwarranted windfall for corporate executives."0 Whether the bene-
fit is a windfall or "remuneration for the service rendered""1 may be largely a
question of analytical semantics. Yet the court in Chinn found the key to be a
clear reading of the contract, which in that case revealed that benefits were only
payable to the extent that the promised performance had accrued to the corpo-
ration. 2 It was the guarantee of a performance in addition to his original obli-
gation that validated the award. Golden parachutes likewise require the promise
to be performed in full before the benefits can be collected." Like the severance
agreement, the golden parachute consideration accrues to the corporation before
benefits are paid.
Severance agreements and golden parachutes may be distinguished by both
the size and the nature of the awards. McMahon, for example, received one full
year's salary and other fringe benefits,84 while Roberts in the Mays Mills case
received only a ten percent bonus in severance.8 5 Moreover, golden parachutes
allow the executive to self-terminate, while severance contracts require the em-
ployer to terminate the worker. While this latter argument is rebutted by noting
that constructive termination results from employer-directed actions which di-
minish status and responsibility, and is therefore effectively at the discretion of
the new employer, severance contracts deal with much smaller payments and
are in this respect inapposite to golden parachutes. Substantial severance deals
may well have prompted a more stringent review by the early courts, and a
77. See supra text accompanying notes 56-68.
78. McMahon, 183 Ga. App. at 545, 359 S.E. 2d at 381.
79. H.S. Kerbaugh, Inc. v. Gray, 212 F. 716, 717 (2d Cir. 1914).
80. Riger, supra note 23, at 39.
81. Gronlund v. Church & Dwight Co., 514 F. Supp. 1304, 1310 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (quoting Owens v. Press
Publishing Co., 20 N.J. 537, 546, 120 A.2d 442, 446 (1956)). See supra text accompanying note 55.
82. 138 Cal. App. 2d at 103, 291 P.2d at 94.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 127-30.
84. McMahon, 183 Ga. App. at 544, 359 S.E.2d at 380. Other awards have been substantially higher. For
example, a golden parachute issued to the chief executive officer of Conoco in 1981 had a value of $3.5 million
over eight years. Riger, supra note 23, at 17-20. Other parachutes have ranged from $3.1 million (Royce Diener,
CEO of American Medical International) to $7.8 million (John Amos, CEO of American Family). Morrison,
Compensation" Those Executive Bailout Deals, FORTUNE, Dec. 13, 1982, at 85.
85. Roberts v. Mays Mills, 184 N.C. 406, 408, 114 S.E. 530, 531 (1922).
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blind application of the severance analysis to multi-million dollar golden
parachutes would be misplaced.
Properly understood, however, the severance approach provides a concep-
tual point of reference from which a more complete analysis can emerge. The
foregoing discussion demonstrates that the purpose and rationale behind golden
parachutes are well rooted in the judicial and corporate history of this country;
the parachute is a close relative of business practices long established in the
corporate landscape.
IV. STOCK OPTION CONTRACTS
Another line of cases offering an established analytical framework for con-
sistent judicial treatment of golden parachutes is the series of stock option cases
from the state of Delaware. 8 While these cases are not squarely on point, they
are quite analogous and present many of the legal issues posed by golden
parachutes.
A. Stock Options Described
Typically, employee stock option plans allow selected employees and execu-
tives to purchase shares of stock from the corporation at prices roughly
equivalent to the market value of the stock at the time the option is granted.8
Such an offer is attractive only if the value of the stock is likely to rise, through
either inflationary pressures or the hard work and diligence of the optionees 88 It
is the proprietary interest spawned by the latter consideration that provides in-
centive for the optionees to work for the benefit of the corporation, because the
return on the option investment hinges on successful performance.
Although these option agreements are now a permanent part of American
corporate practice, they produced considerable litigation at their initial appear-
ance, the controversy focusing on sufficiency of consideration and corporate self-
dealing.89 As with severance agreements," the arguments marshalled favoring
and opposing stock options are strikingly similar to those heard today regarding
golden parachutes.
86. See Riger, supra note 23, at 27-29. In his critique of golden parachutes, Riger suggests an analogy
between golden parachutes and stock options. Citing what he refers to as the Retention and Distraction Theses, id.
at 28-30, Riger correctly pinpoints areas in which stock options and golden parachutes are similar. His central
concern with adequacy of consideration, id. at 17, is also thoroughly treated in the Delaware cases. It is interest-
ing to note that his observation that Delaware was likely to be the first state to address the golden parachute issue,
due to the number of then-outstanding cases in the Delaware courts, has not come to pass. To date, not a single
case on the subject has been decided in Delaware.
87. Annotation, Validity of Stock-Option Plan Under Which Selected Personnel of Corporation May Ac-
quire Stock Interest Therein, 34 A.L.R.2d 852, 854 (1954).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See supra Part Ill.
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B. Cases Examined
Turning first to the consideration issue, nowhere is the question more com-
pletely addressed than in Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, Inc.91 The court
in Kerbs said that the validity of a stock option plan depended solely on the
existence of consideration flowing to the corporation and the existence of cir-
cumstances or conditions guaranteeing that the corporation would receive the
benefit promised by the optionee.9 ' The difficult question, however, is what con-
stitutes sufficient consideration?
Kerbs asserted that the finding of sufficient consideration will always be a
fact-specific inquiry,9 3 but that there must be "a reasonable relationship be-
tween the value of the services to be rendered by the employee and the value of
the options granted as an inducement or compensation." 9' The court went on to
include attraction and retention of employees as a valid basis for finding
consideration. 5
The Kerbs court was not alone in recognizing the adequacy of considera-
tion when one is induced to work for a company by use of a stock option con-
tract. In McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co.,99 the court dismissed the
failure-of-consideration argument by noting that the defendant's promise to as-
sume the title and duties of chairman of the board of directors was by itself
sufficient consideration to support the option.97 Similarly, the court in Wise v.
Universal Corp.98 held that when used as an inducement to enter employment,
stock options were supported by consideration.99 This conclusion was further
strengthened by the finding that the various defendants had foregone other em-
ployment opportunities and bound themselves contractually to the
corporation. 100
Kerbs was also on well-established judicial ground when it insisted upon
"some circumstance[s] which may reasonably be regarded as sufficient to insure
that the corporation will receive that which it desires to obtain by granting the
options."'' This concern was directed toward the retention of employees after
the granting of the option. The court in Forman v. Chesler,'0 urging that reten-
tion of key employees was an important corporate concern,' 0 3 upheld an option
contract because the terms of the agreement required the optionees to remain
on the job for at least eighteen months and forbade them from engaging in any
91. 33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A.2d 652 (1952). See also Comment, supra note 41, at 536-40.
92. Kerbs, 33 Del. Ch. at 74, 90 A.2d at 656.
93. Id.
94. Id. See Note, supra note 4.
95. Kerbs, 33 Del. Ch. at 74, 90 A.2d at 656.
96. 27 F. Supp. 639 (D. Md. 1939).
97. Id. at 649.
98. 93 F. Supp. 393 (D. Del. 1950).
99. Id. at 396.
100. Id.
101. Kerbs, 33 Del. Ch. at 77, 90 A.2d at 657; accord Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, 160-61, 160 A.2d
731, 736 (1960).
102. 39 Del. Ch. 484, 167 A.2d 442 (1961).
103. Id. at 492-93, 167 A.2d at 447.
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competitive business for at least ten years. 04 Because of these terms the prom-
ised performance was ensured. In Saigh v. Busch,10 5 a shareholder's derivative
suit sought to set aside a stock option given to a long-time company officer,
contending that his enduring tenure and then-current stock holdings rendered
unlikely his departure; hence, the option was needless as an inducement to re-
main and was therefore a waste of corporate assets.'06 The court rejected this
position, noting that the low risk of the officer's departure was far outweighed
by the potential damage to the company were he to leave.107 Thus, even a tenu-
ous retention argument was sufficient to support a finding of consideration.
It is clear from the foregoing decisions that stock options are supported by
consideration if they attract or retain employees and if they guarantee that the
corporation will receive the employee's promised performance."0 8 Indeed, it was
the failure to guarantee performance that was fatal to the option contract in
Kerbs.09
Stock options were also attacked on the grounds that they were gratuities,
conjured up by well-paid executives and issued to themselves." 0 Conceived of as
such, stock options can be viewed as products of executive self-dealing. How-
ever, Wise v. Universal Corp.,'" in upholding an option agreement, pointed to
the contract's ratification by eighty-six percent of the disinterested certificate
holders and concluded that no fraud or self-dealing was present."' Evidently,
because the shareholders were informed and approved the action prior to issu-
ance, no self-dealing would be found. In Kerbs the plaintiffs argued that be-
cause five of eight directors who approved the plan were its beneficiaries, the
board's action was illegal." 3 This argument failed, however, because a majority
of disinterested stockholders ratified the plan, thus curing any defect in the
board's action." 4 In the above cases, full disclosure and stockholder approval
removed all doubts concerning fraud and executive self-dealing.
C. Golden Parachutes and Stock Options Compared
The Kerbs case established a two-prong inquiry for determining the valid-
ity of stock option contracts: the existence of consideration, and circumstances
surrounding the contract ensuring that the contemplated consideration would in
fact pass to the corporation." 5
It cannot be doubted that golden parachutes pass the first prong of the test.
Their increasing popularity indicates that they are effective in attracting and
104. Id.
105. 403 S.W.2d 559 (Mo. 1966).
106. Id. at 564.
107. Id.
108. Frankel v. Donovan, 35 Del. Ch. 433, 438, 120 A.2d 311, 314 (1956).
109. Kerbs, 33 Del. Ch. at 75, 90 A.2d at 656.
110. Annotation, supra note 87, at 854.
Ill. 93 F. Supp. 393 (D. Del. 1950).
112. Id. at 397.
113. Kerbs, 33 Del. Ch. at 78-79, 90 A.2d at 658.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 74, 90 A.2d at 656.
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retaining executives,1 " so much so that companies assert that they must offer
such a deal if they are to be at all competitive in their recruiting." 7 Kerbs
explicitly found attraction and retention to be consideration sufficient to support
a stock option."i 8 Because golden parachutes also attract and retain employees,
they are likewise supported by consideration. Indeed, it was the retention of
employees that was intended in the golden parachute issued in McMahon, just
as Worth v. Huntington Bancshares, Inc."1 9 and Koenings v. Joseph Schlitz
Brewing Co."10 illustrate the golden parachute's effectiveness in retaining em-
ployees during takeover negotiations. In fact, retention is the reason most often
cited by the courts for validating golden parachutes. In Buckhorn, Inc. v.
Ropak Corp.,' golden parachutes were held to be a reasonable response to a
threatened takeover, primarily because the agreements would retain key em-
ployees without present costs accruing to the corporation. 122 Retention was
viewed as furthering shareholder interests123 and was thus a valid corporate
purpose.
Critics assert that attraction and retention alone are not enough to support
a finding of consideration. 24 Regarding retention, it has been persuasively ar-
gued that "[c]orporate executives have a pre-existing duty to give the proper
attention and dedication to their corporate duties by virtue of statutes, their
employment contracts, and/or basic business ethics." 1 5 In other words, when
one does that which he is already obligated to do, that action is the performance
itself, not the giving of consideration. 2 6 Again, this argument is answered by
noting that while an executive is obligated to act in the best interests of the
corporation, he or she is not obligated to work in perpetuity for it. The golden
116. G. DWYER. "GOLDEN PARACHUTES" AND CORPORATE TAKEOVERS-A NEW SURVEY (1983) (Ward
Howell International).
117. Profusek, Executive Employment Contracts in the Takeover Context, 6 CORP. L. REV. 99, 100 (1983).
This perception was acknowledged by John P. Finnerty, senior vice president of human resources for National
Westminster Bank, who, when asked why he awarded golden parachutes to two new employees, responded: "We
couldn't have gotten them without it." Deutsch, When a Handshake Isn't Enough, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1990, at
F29, col. 3.
118. Kerbs, 33 Del. Ch. at 74, 90 A.2d at 656.
119. No. 52861, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App., 8th Dist., Nov. 25, 1987).
120. 126 Wis. 2d 349, 377 N.W.2d 593 (1985).
121. 656 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Ohio), af'd, 815 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1987).
122. 656 F. Supp. at 232-33.
123. Id.
124. See Riger, supra note 23, at 29.
125. Note, Platinum Parachutes: Who's Protecting the Shareholder?, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 653, 666 (1986).
Another commentator has asserted that "management should not require additional compensation to perform the
job for which it was originally hired." Comment, supra note 41, at 533. Moralizing aside, it is one-sided to
characterize the offering of a golden parachute as "required" by management when these agreements are freely
given by independent compensation committees, in whose discretion the law confers decisionmaking on remunera-
tive policy. The fact that parachutes are often given to mid-level employees, who presumably have little bargain-
ing power, suggests that other factors motivate compensation committees. Clearly, if "additional" compensation
can be said to have been "required," it can as easily be said to have been "offered."
Mounting this treadmill of verbiage is, however, of no value to the analysis of the real issue at hand: the
obligation of an employee to remain with an employer when he is not otherwise bound to do so. A golden para-
chute is no more an "additional compensation" than is a severance contract. See supra Part III. Such a sum is in
effect a part of the stipulated remuneration, see supra text accompanying note 55, not an amount in addition to
the originally agreed upon sum.
126. Ruffin v, Mercury Record Prods., Inc., 513 F.2d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1975).
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parachute induces the employee to remain with a company during a takeover
where no prior obligation would compel him or her to do so. The critics who
suggest that during merger activity the duty to perform with dedication and
vigor is inherent to corporate employment are doubtless correct. But while there
may be a moral obligation to perform, there is no legal one. Absent a written
employment contract, an executive has no legal obligation to remain on the job.
In other words, in an employment-at-will situation, there is no pre-existing duty
to perform, because the executive is not compelled to remain with the company
during a takeover.
It is also clear that the nature of the golden parachute satisfies the second
prong of the Kerbs test, that the circumstances guarantee the contemplated con-
sideration to flow to the corporation.127 In McQuillen the court noted that de-
spite the existence of a statute prohibiting the issuance of stock for future ser-
vices, the contract was valid because it purported only to allow for future
delivery of stock if and when the services were periodically completed.128 Be-
cause the stock delivery was contingent upon successful performance of corpo-
rate duties, no stock could be obtained unless the promised performance flowed
to the company, thereby supporting the bargain.
Golden parachutes, by their very construction, require a similar perform-
ance. Because the object of the promised performance is for the employee to
remain with the company during a takeover struggle, and because the takeover
must be consummated before the contract can be exercised, the promised per-
formance is absolutely guaranteed. Like McQuillen, in which future delivery of
stock was contingent upon completion of future services, the future delivery of
parachute payments is contingent upon remaining with the company throughout
the merger-a future service.'29 The employee cannot collect until he or she
performs. Moreover, with regard to past consideration, when the takeover oc-
curs after the golden parachute is issued, there is no past service to compensate
for, because the service the contract seeks does not come into existence until
takeover negotiations begin . 30 Hence, the golden parachute cannot compensate
for past service.
As shown above, golden parachutes adhere to the requirement of the Kerbs
test, demonstrating that Kerbs affords an analytical framework with which to
analyze the golden parachute. Because golden parachutes attract and retain em-
ployees, do not compensate for past service or pre-existing duty, and guarantee
the performance they seek, they are valid under the Kerbs test.
V. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES ANALYSIS
Golden parachutes have also appeared as clauses for stipulated damages in
a written employment contract, as in the Wisconsin case Koenings v. Joseph
127. See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
128. McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 27 F. Supp. 639, 649 (D. Md. 1939). See also Hood &
Benge, supra note 6, at 222-23 (citing Ash v. Brunswick Corp., 405 F. Supp. 235, 240 (D. Del. 1975)).
129. McQuillen, 27 F. Supp. at 649.
130. Hood & Benge, supra note 6, at 224-25.
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Schlitz Brewing Co.131 In that case Koenings, a senior staff attorney with
Schlitz Brewing Company, brought an action against his employer for damages
under an employment contract entitling him to receive a salary for the balance
of the contract term, provided he suffered a termination or reduction in job
status resulting from a takeover.1 32 Subsequent to a merger, Koenings exercised
his option and went immediately to another company, where he received the
same salary he had received at Schlitz. 33 Schlitz denied his benefits, arguing
that because he suffered no takeover-related loss," 4 he had a duty to mitigate
his damages.
A. Liquidated Damages Described
Generally, liquidated damages are contractual provisions that preset an
amount payable to a party injured by a breach of contract.135 In determining
the validity of such clauses, courts will inquire as to: 1) whether the parties
intended to provide damages or a penalty; 2) whether the injury caused by the
breach was difficult or impossible to ascertain at the time the contract was exe-
cuted; and 3) whether the stipulated damages were a reasonable forecast of the
harm caused by the breach." 36 If a reasonable relation is found between the
anticinated and actual damages, the contract will not be void as unconscionable
or against public policy. 1 7 However, if the anticipated and actual damages
greatly diverge, or if the clause was intended to compel performance, it will be
deemed a penalty and will not be enforced." 8 Finally, if the amount is found to
be reasonable, no duty to mitigate damages will arise."39
B. Analysis
The Koenings court, in its liquidated damages analysis, identified two sali-
ent issues that are also sharply disputed by critics of golden parachutes: whether
the damage clause was reasonable 140 and whether a duty to mitigate damages
arose.'
4
'
As an initial matter, however, it is startling that the court never mentioned
the termination clause of the parachute in its opinion. In upholding the lower
court,1 2 the Wisconsin Supreme Court apparently decided that Koenings did
131. 126 Wis. 2d 349, 377 N.W.2d 593 (1985).
132. Id. at 353-54 n.2, 377 N.W.2d at 596 n.2.
133. Id. at 355, 377 N.W.2d at 597.
134. Id. at 367-68, 377 N.W.2d at 602-03.
135. E.g., Layton Mfg. Co. v. Dulien Steel, Inc., 277 Or. 343, 346-47, 560 P.2d 1058, 1060 (1977).
136. Id.; Higgs v. United States, 546 F.2d 373, 377 (Ct. CI. 1976); Wassenaar v. Panos, I11 Wis. 2d 518,
529-30, 331 N.W.2d 357, 363 (1983).
137. Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Justice, 673 F.2d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 1982).
138. Brecher v. Laikin, 430 F. Supp. 103, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
139. Wassenaar, III Wis. 2d at 521, 331 N.W.2d at 359.
140. Koenings v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 126 Wis. 2d 349, 358, 377 N.W.2d 593, 598 (1985).
141. Id. at 361, 377 N.W.2d at 599.
142. Koenings v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 123 Wis. 2d 490, 368 N.W.2d 690 (Ct. App. 1985).
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not terminate his employment voluntarily.143 The court agreed with the jury
below, which found that Koenings' status and responsibility had indeed been
reduced because of the takeover . 44
Critics of golden parachutes have questioned the propriety of allowing an
employee to determine for him or herself when job status has been reduced, and
they suggest that such unconditional mechanisms should be invalidated. 145
However, in the context of any agreement enumerating specific conditions of
employment, the employer has undertaken specific promises, the failure of
which to perform constitutes a breach of the contract. The employer, therefore,
by breaching its promises, is responsible for the termination, not the employee.
Hence, termination is necessarily involuntary. Self-termination is a misnomer.
A job-related termination trigger, such as the one Koenings had, is to be
distinguished from an illusory trigger. Critics correctly argue that a contract
requiring only minimal triggering events, such as a change of office location'46
or an unconditional termination right,"47 should be invalidated because the em-
ployee has suffered no meaningful takeover-related harm. An unconditional ter-
mination right is best understood as an illusory promise, because the perform-
ance accruing to the corporation is simply too insubstantial to support the
corporation's obligation to pay the employee. 4" To argue that a mere change in
office location would impair an employee's ability to perform "would require a
degree of naivet6 which should not be demanded even of judges."'149 Such a
clause would truly be a self-terminating trigger and would not fulfill the dual
object of the corporation's bargain-to retain employees during and after a
merger absent constructive or actual termination.
The Koenings court addressed the reasonableness of the damage award by
applying a totality-of-the-circumstances test. 50 Focusing on whether the dam-
ages were a reasonable forecast of harm caused by the breach, the court looked
not only at actual damages but also at consequential damages, rejecting
Schlitz's argument that such damages were outside the scope of the parties'
original contemplation.' 5' By allowing evidence of compensatory damage into
the original forecast, including salary, benefits, prestige, and emotional distress,
the court broadened the spectrum of damages it considered, thus harmonizing
what otherwise would have been a wide discrepancy between the stipulated and
actual damages.
143. Koenings v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 126 Wis. 2d 349, 354, 377 N.W.2d 593, 596-97 (1985). The
court's silence on this point is presumed to indicate its approval of the termination clause. Indeed, there would
have been no reason for the court to reach the mitigation of damages issue had this threshold not been met.
144. Id. at 355 n.4, 377 N.W.2d at 597 n.4.
145. Note, supra note 3, at 925.
146. Profusek, supra note 117, at 107.
147. Note, supra note 32, at 1120 n.9.
148. In the extreme ease, it is difficult to justify the paradox of an executive exercising his or her termination
rights under the contract, only to remain in the employ of the corporation. See, e.g., Hood & Benge, supra note 6,
at 202 n.13. Although it may be argued that the organization in this situation received the benefit of its bar-
gain-employee retention during the takeover attempt-so incongruous a result would be intolerable.
149. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 687 (1981).
150. Koenings, 126 Wis. 2d at 361, 377 N.W.2d at 599.
151. Id. at 365-66, 377 N.W.2d at 602.
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Generally, whenever a dispute arises regarding the amount of stipulated
damages, if the amount is reasonably related to the anticipated or actual dam-
ages and is not otherwise excessive, a defense of unconscionability will not suc-
ceed.1 2 The court's broad-based damage analysis removed from the compensa-
tion clause any hint of waste, excess, or unconscionability. This conclusion was
doubtless bolstered by the fact that Koenings' ultimate award was 44,416.66
dollars-less than one year's salary.153 Like the contract in Koenings, a well-
drafted golden parachute can also compensate for a broad range of objectively
ascertainable losses, which, applying the Koenings damage analysis, can be up-
held in the context of a stipulated damages clause.
Finally, in brief treatment, the court in Koenings said that the mitigation
of damages issue was irrelevant if the stipulated damage clause was found to be
reasonable.1 54 As in McMahon,'5 the necessary implication of such a view is
that once the reasonableness of the compensation clause is established, the para-
chute award accrues as an absolute right. No further judicial inquiry is merited.
One commentator urges that inclusion of a mitigation clause will enhance the
likelihood that the contract will be upheld if challenged. 56 Although the practi-
cal wisdom of this suggestion cannot be doubted, such a conclusion rests on the
assumption that the golden parachute is something other than a traditional em-
ployment contract.15 7 Judicial treatment has not expressed the same concern,
however, for mitigation was expressly rejected in Koenings and was not even
mentioned in McMahon or Worth.
Within the context of a written employment contract, a stipulated damages
clause can encompass many of the elements the golden parachute purports to
embrace. By establishing its own terms for performance, a party injured by
breach of promise finds the damage clause to be automatically triggered. Like-
wise, the golden parachute is triggered by a reduction in job status (or actual
termination) contrary to prior agreement. While critics debate the reasonable-
ness of parachute benefits, the liquidated damage analysis provides a framework
for ascertaining reasonableness and voids unconscionable awards. As with sever-
ance and option contracts, the liquidated damage analysis provides a traditional
and predictable analytical model with which to scrutinize some elements of the
golden parachute.
152. In re D. Federico Co., 25 Bankr. 822, 832 (D. Mass. 1982), aff'd sub nom. D. Federico Co. v. New
Bedford Rdev. Auth., 723 F.2d 122 (1983). See Ramada Dev. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 626
F.2d 517 (6th Cir. 1980).
153. Koenings, 126 Wis. 2d at 357, 377 N.W.2d at 597-98.
154. Id. at 361, 377 N.W.2d at 599.
155. Royal Crown Cos. v. MeMahon, 183 Ga. App. 543, 359 S.E.2d 379, cert. denied, 183 Ga. App. 907
(1987).
156. Profusek, supra note 117, at 104.
157. Id. Profusek notes the general absence of mitigation clauses in severance pay contracts. The recent
cases, all of which postdate his article, seem to suggest that courts are not much concerned with mitigation of
damages especially when the awards seem reasonable.
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VI. INTERPRETIVE ANALYSIS
The most recent and by far the most thorough case to deal with golden
parachutes is Worth v. Huntington Bancshares, Inc."" Worth demonstrated the
continued vitality of traditional contract analysis by utilizing a straightforward
interpretive approach in scrutinizing the termination agreement. By applying
the business judgment rule and focusing on the actions of the plaintiff, the court
upheld the validity of the contract while denying its benefits to Worth. 5
A. Interpretation
The overarching principle of contract interpretation is that courts are free
to look at the totality of relevant circumstances surrounding a given transac-
tion, 1 0 including acts or statements of parties in prior negotiations and any ap-
plicable course of dealing, course of performance, or usage of trade if such fac-
tors are used to give meaning to the contract terms.""' The purpose of so broad
an inquiry is to construe contractual provisions so as to effectuate the spirit and
purpose of the original agreement.' 6 ' The contract must be construed as a whole
and interpreted to harmonize and give meaning to all its provisions.' 6 ' "[An]
interpretation which gives a reasonable meaning to all parts will be preferred to
one which leaves a portion of it useless, inexplicable, inoperative, void, insignifi-
cant, meaningless, superfluous, or achieves a weird or whimsical result."' 6 An
overriding concern is that the agreement should not be interpreted in a manner
that will place one party wholly at the will or mercy of another. 65 It is within
the context of this traditional interpretive approach that the court examined
Worth's golden parachute, focusing primarily on two issues: 1) whether Worth
exercised his termination option in good faith; 6' and 2) whether golden
parachutes generally are valid contracts.' 67
B. Worth Examined
The court of appeals began its analysis by noting that the trigger events
required Worth's good faith determination as to whether his professional status
or responsibility had been diminished, 68 and whether his resignation was based
158. 43 Ohio St. 3d 192, 540 N.E.2d 249 (1989), aFfig No. 52861 (Ohio Ct. App., 8th Dist., Nov. 25, 1987).
Because the Ohio Supreme Court unanimously upheld the court of appeals, and because the appellate decision
was so complete in its analysis, the appellate decision will serve as the basis for this section, See also its compan-
ion case, Orin v. Huntington Bancshares, Inc., No. 61129 (Cuy. County Ct. C.P. Sept. 30, 1986).
159. Worth, No. 52861, slip op. at 14-57.
160. E.A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.10 (1982).
161. Id.; A. CORBIN, supra note 53, § 543.
162. Arizona ex rel Ariz. Dep't of Transp. v. United States, 216 Ct. Cl. 221, 235, 575 F.2d 855, 863 (1978).
163. Id.; Raytheon Co. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 763, 768 (1983).
164. Arizona, 216 Ct. Cl. at 236, 575 F.2d at 863.
165. United States v. Board of Educ. of Chicago, 588 F. Supp. 132, 242 (N.D. Ill.) (citing The Padbloc Co.
v. United States, 161 Ct. Cl. 369, 376-77 (1963)), vacated, 744 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1984).
166. Worth, No. 52861, slip op. at 13-38.
167. Id. at 38-57.
168. Id. at 14.
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on that determination."l 9 Rejecting Worth's proffered definition of good faith, 7 0
the court instead agreed with the trial court that "the term 'good faith' is com-
monly characterized as one in which the party acting in good faith obligates
himself not to act on speculative reasons."'' In adopting a more common use of
the term,' 72 the court affirmed the previous findings that "diminished," "sta-
tus," and "responsibility," though not precisely defined, comported with normal
use, thus meriting denial of Worth's claim that the trial court's use of restrictive
definitions constituted reversible error. 73 The court manifested the notion that
parties to an agreement have used the language it contains in a way reasonable
people ordinarily do.' 74 Implicit in the court's rejection of Worth's subjective
definition of good faith was the idea that to allow so speculative an action by
Worth would place the defendant wholly at Worth's mercy without a meaning-
ful way to ascertain the validity of the decision. 7 5 To bolster its contention that
the parties had agreed to a working understanding of the mutual obligations
regarding exercise of the termination option, the court examined relevant cir-
cumstances surrounding the discussions preceding issuance of the contract, 76
including testimony of the drafters. 17 7 Important also was evidence of Worth's
motives, such as his refusal to seek accurate information from superiors, his
disenchantment with his job, his failure to seek work locally, and his desire to
return to his home state. 7  This intensive examination of the factual circum-
stances surrounding both the contract's drafting and Worth's subsequent exer-
cise of the termination clause is a classic example of a court inquiring into
events surrounding a contract in order to give meaning to its terms and to estab-
lish the parties' conformity to the agreement.'7
The court went on to analyze the validity of the contract itself by applica-
tion of two conventional norms of contract and corporate law: the ratification
theory 80 and the business judgment rule.' 8' As a preliminary matter, Worth,
consistent with McMahon, rejected Huntington's argument that the contract
was not supported by consideration.' 8' It cited the retention of top-quality sen-
ior management as a benefit to the corporation and employment foregone as a
detriment to the employee.18' The court so held despite the fact that the con-
169. See id. app. at Ill.
170. Worth contended that only a showing of subjective good faith was required in the contract. Id. at 15.
171. Id. at 17.
172. See, e.g., Doyle v. Gordon, 158 N.Y.S.2d 248, 259-60 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
173. Worth, No. 52861, slip op. at 13-38.
174. See, e.g., Wabash, Inc. v. Avnot, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 995, 998 (N.D. I11. 1981); E.A. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 160, § 7.11.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 14-29, 164-65.
176. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
177. Worth, No. 52861, slip op. at 18.
178. Id. at 27-29.
179. See Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
180. Worth, No. 52861, slip op. at 42.
181. Id. at 46. See United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64 (1917); Note,
supra note 3.
182. Worth, No. 52861, slip op. at 45.
183. Id. See also Orin v. Huntington Baneshares, Inc., No. 61129, slip op. at 20 (Cuy. County Ct. C.P. Sept.
30, 1986).
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tract was issued after Worth had become an employee, as distinguished from
golden parachutes issued as part of an integrated employment contract.184 It
appears well settled, especially in light of the stock option 85 and severance
cases, 18  that inducements offered subsequent to employment, designed to retain
employees, are presumptively valid concerning consideration, whether in the
context of employment at will or a written employment contract.
Worth also dismissed challenges of self-dealing on the theory of ratifica-
tion. 187 The court observed that Huntington knew of Worth's contract prior to
its acquisition of UCB and that by its acquiescence it impliedly ratified the
agreement. 8 8 As in Kerbs, Koenings, and McMahon, the self-dealing argument
was sufficiently answered by a showing of shareholder approval upon full disclo-
sure of the golden parachute agreement.
Finally, in response to Huntington's charge that the contract was a waste
of corporate assets, the Worth court used the business judgment rule' to ex-
amine the contract's validity.8 0 Noting that the business judgment rule "man-
dates inquiry into the facts and circumstances . . . to ascertain whether the...
decision [to issue the contract] was an ... informed [one],"'g' the court scruti-
nized the change-of-control clause, the termination clause, and the compensa-
tion clause. 192 Because the term "golden parachute" was not legally signifi-
cant,193 the court instead examined each clause for its reasonableness and
conformity to legitimate corporate concerns.""
The change-of-control clause required the acquiring company to obtain at
least thirty percent of Huntington's stock.'95 The court used a fact-specific in-
quiry into the exact proportion of stock required to trigger the clause, noting
that its purpose was to identify corporate changes that could threaten the exec-
utive's career.188 Should the clause be found to require only a nominal stock
acquisition, the contract should be invalidated, the court argued, as providing a
windfall and not really protecting against a true threat to the executive. 97
The court is correct on this point, but for the wrong reasons. First, it is true
that a nominal acquisition ought to be insufficient to trigger the contract, but
this is so because any resulting change in the employee's status would not have
184. Worth, No. 52861, slip op. at 42-43 n.8; See also Koenings v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 126 Wis. 2d
349, 350, 377 N.W.2d 593, 595 (1985).
185. See supra Part IV.
186. See supra Part Ill.
187. Worth, No. 52861, slip op. at 42. See also the court's discussion of self-dealing, id. at 50-51.
188. Id. at 42.
189. See United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64 (1917).
190. Worth, No. 52861, slip op. at 46-57. See also Note, supra note 3.
191. Worth, No. 52861, slip op. at 48 (quoting Arsh, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L
REv. 93, 100-04 (1979)).
192. Id. at 51-57.
193. This determination, implicit in the court of appeals decision, was made explicit by the supreme court.
Worth, 43 Ohio St. 3d at 196, 540 N.E.2d at 254. See Koenings, 126 Wis. 2d at 360, 377 N.W.2d at 599;
McMahon, 183 Ga. App. at 545, 359 S.E.2d at 381.
194. Worth, No. 52861, slip op. at 26-29.
195. Worth, No. 52861, slip op. at 53.
196. Id. at 51 (quoting Note, supra note 3, at 925).
197. Id. at 52.
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resulted from an acquisition-related change in company policy. It is one thing to
insulate executives from the hazards of merger-related dismissals; it is quite
another to paralyze corporate policymaking by holding boards hostage to minor
changes in the composition of the corporation's shareholders. Golden
parachutes, if they serve any purpose at all, ought to protect against only take-
over-related termination.
Second, though an executive may find life with a new corporation unpleas-
ant, the fact that a new company is in charge is hardly career-threatening.
Doubtless it threatens his job, but not his career. Competence and ability are
the touchstones of performance; there is always room in the marketplace for
talented executives. 198 While this argument loses some force in light of those
jobs which require firm-specific knowledge 99 (because such skills are not always
readily marketable), it is nevertheless strained to suggest that job loss is tanta-
mount to career loss. Because career loss is more often based on competence, if
a golden parachute serves to protect incompetence, it is economically inefficient
and therefore wasteful of assets, and should be invalidated. Such a purpose
would be so repugnant to public policy and common sense" 0 that a court would
be remiss not to void the contract on this point alone. Career threat ought not to
be the rationale supporting the change-of-control clause.
Finally, it is curious that the court would denominate the change-of-control
clause as one the purpose of which was to identify career-threatening situations,
especially in light of its earlier pronouncement that the contract's purpose was
to retain a valued employee.' 0' Indeed, it was on the retention theory that the
consideration was found to support the contract at all.20 ' Moreover, the agree-
ment did not purport to be one protecting Worth's career-it merely sought to
retain his services. In light of the court's own findings, the logical purpose of the
change-of-control clause is properly seen as the event for which the contract was
issued and the condition precedent to the termination clause. 03
The termination clause was upheld because it required Worth to exercise
an objective good faith determination of job reduction before it could be exer-
cised.204 The court's insistence on an objective standard was doubtless motivated
by the need to establish a test with which to measure the validity of the termi-
nation clause. Yet the issue of Worth's good faith seems misplaced in light of
the Koenings court's observations about constructive termination. 05 If, as Koen-
ings held, the employer is responsible for constructive termination (because it is
the employer's decision to reduce job status or duty),' 06 then the appropriate
inquiry ought to have been whether there was in fact any such diminution. The
correct focus, therefore, is on the job itself, not on the employee's decision to
198. Comment, supra note 41, at 532.
199. Note, supra note 3, at 917.
200. See Marathon Oil Co. v. Kleppe, 407 F. Supp. 1301, 1306 (D. Wyo. 1975).
201. Worth, No. 52861, slip op. at 43.
202. See supra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
203. Worth, No. 52861, slip op. at 42.
204. See supra notes 170-79 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 142-49 and accompanying text.
206. Koenings, 126 Wis. 2d at 352, 377 N.W.2d at 596.
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leave, and the test of diminution should be an objective examination of the sur-
rounding facts. Such an examination in the Worth case could have changed the
final result.
Finally, the compensation clause was found reasonable in light of two basic
considerations: 1) a liquidated damages analysis; and 2) the Deficit Reduction
Act of 1984.207 The court's brief treatment of the compensation issue suggests
that the statutory parameters were definitive in its analysis. Nevertheless, the
court noted that the compensation clause should reflect the expected magnitude
of the executive's loss,208 and it endorsed Koenings' use of liquidated damages
as an appropriate framework within which to assess the reasonableness of the
compensation. 0 9
Worth is important in several ways. It is consistent with its predecessors in
rejecting the term "golden parachute" as being of probative value and in finding
the contract to be valid and supported by consideration. Also intriguing is the
fact that Worth, like Koenings, had no difficulty in upholding the golden para-
chute when issued to a mid-level employee rather than to a top policymaking
executive, contrary to the implications of many commentators.210
Another point of crucial importance relates to the indemnity clause,21'
under which Huntington promised to pay the legal fees arising from any con-
tested exercise of the contract. The Ohio Supreme Court held:
207. Worth, No. 52861, slip op. at 55; The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 7, 98 Stat.
494, and other tax provisions are beyond the scope of this Note. It should be noted, however, that the Act limits
golden parachute payments to a maximum payment of three times the executive's annual salary. Payments beyond
this amount will cause the corporation to lose its deduction for the payment and will cause a twenty percent excise
tax to be imposed on the payment's beneficiary. For a more complete treatment of tax consequences, see generally
Johnson, supra note 1.
208. Worth, No. 52861, slip op. at 55 (quoting Note, supra note 3, at 926).
209. Id. at 55.
210. See Profusek, supra note 117, at 99; Riger, supra note 23, at 15-16; Note, supra note 3, at 909; Note,
supra note 4, at 957-58. Indeed, golden parachutes are now routinely given to employees who are not top officers.
Deutsch, supra note' 117.
211. Worth's contract contained the following indemnity clause:
5. Enforcement Costs. The Company is aware that upon the occurrence of a change in control the Board
of Directors or a stockholder of the Company may then cause or attempt to cause the Company to refuse
to comply with its obligations under this Agreement, or may cause or attempt to cause the Company to
institute, or may institute, litigation seeking to have this Agreement declared unenforceable, or may take,
or attempt to take, other action to deny Employee the benefits intended under this Agreement. In these
circumstances, the purpose of this Agreement could be frustrated. It is the intent of the Company that
Employee not be required to incur the expenses associated with the enforcement of his rights under this
Agreement by litigation or other legal action because the cost and expense thereof would substantially
detract from the benefits intended to be extended to Employee hereunder, nor be bound to negotiate any
settlement of his rights hereunder under threat of incurring such expenses. Accordingly, if following a
change in control it should appear to Employee that the Company has failed to comply with any of its
obligations under this Agreement or in the event that the Company or any other person takes any action
to declare this Agreement void or unenforceable, or institutes any litigation or other legal action designed
to deny, diminish or to recover from, Employee the benefits intended to be provided to Employee hereun-
der, and that Employee has complied with all of his obligations under this Agreement, the Company
irrevocably authorizes Employee from time to time to retain counsel of his choice at the expense of the
Company as provided in this Section 5, to represent Employee in connection with the initiation or defense
of any litigation or other legal action, whether by or against the Company or any Director, officer, stock-
holder or other person affiliated with the Company, in any jurisdiction. Notwithstanding any existing or
prior attorney-client relationship between the Company and such counsel, the Company irrevocably con-
sents to Employee entering into an attorney-client relationship with such counsel, and in that connection
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[T]he provision in Worth's agreement is not contingent on his success in enforcing the
agreement's other provisions .... [W]here a contract provides for indemnification of
legal expenses incurred by a party in enforcing or defending same, but does not make
such indemnification contingent on success in enforcing the contract's other provisions,
the party is entitled to indemnification of his legal expenses incurred in enforcing the
contract notwithstanding his lack of success, provided the party has not acted in bad
faith or with no colorable claim of success.212
Worth was awarded full legal fees.213
Most important, Worth, again like its predecessors, used conventional con-
tract analysis to interpret the terms of the contract. Notwithstanding some ana-
lytical difficulties, the court demonstrated that golden parachutes are suscepti-
ble to close scrutiny and can be invalidated when recipients operate outside the
contract's intent. Worth makes it clear that the courts are prepared to recognize
golden parachutes as valid contracts. They are equally prepared to void them in
the presence of bad faith.
VII. PROPOSAL
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the salient issues presented by
golden parachutes may be addressed in the context of at least four traditional
contract analyses: severance agreements, stock options, liquidated damages, and
interpretive analysis. It is thus apparent that golden parachute agreements are
nothing more than a modern variation on contracts that for years have been
fixtures in the corporate firmament, validated by countless judges in countless
courtrooms. It is in recognition of this fact that court decisions concerning
golden parachutes are unanimous in rejecting the term itself as being of legal
significance. Yet each court has applied a different analysis to the agreements,
and while it is true that golden parachutes are not new, there is nonetheless a
need to agree on a consistent judicial approach to their interpretation if judicial
certainty and economy are to be served. In light of the increasing use of such
contracts, it is likely that they will become a familiar presence in corporate
litigation for some time. This Note will now propose a four-part analysis, based
upon the foregoing contract principles, for analysis of golden parachutes.
A. Test
The following test embraces the concerns of the cases discussed above, ad-
dressing the principal issues of consideration, damages, corporate self-dealing,
and performance. For a golden parachute to be valid, the following conjunctive
questions must be answered in the affirmative:
the Company and Employee agree that a confidential relationship shall exist between Employee and such
counsel. The reasonable fees and expenses of counsel selected from time to time by Employee as herein-
above provided shall be paid or reimbursed to Employee by the Company on a regular, periodic basis upon
presentation by Employee of a statement or statements prepared by such counsel in accordance with its
customary practices, up to a maximum aggregate amount of $500,000.
43 Ohio St. 3d at 198 n.4, 540 N.E.2d at 256 n.4. See also Worth v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 32 Ohio St. 3d
238. 239-40, 513 N.E.2d 253, 255 (1987).
212. 43 Ohio St. 3d at 199-200, 540 N.E.2d at 257.
213. Id. at 200, 540 N.E.2d at 257.
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1. Did the contract function to attract or retain the employee?
2. Was the award a reasonable forecast of harm?
3. Did the contract result from an arms-length transaction?
4. Did consideration in fact accrue to the corporation?
1. Did the Contract Function to Attract or Retain the Employee?
Under the common law, a contract must be supported by consideration if it
is to be enforced.214 The first prong of the proposed test is designed to answer
this threshold question within the framework of the stock option and severance
cases. Those cases consistently held that where a bonus was used to induce one
to accept employment, the acceptance and resulting promise to work were suffi-
cient consideration to support the bonus offered.215 In Gaillard v. Natomas Co.,
the court recognized that attraction of executives by use of a golden parachute
is a valid corporate purpose and that the contract is enforceable if negotiated as
part of an overall compensation package.21 6 Therefore, if a golden parachute is
used as an incentive to lure an executive to a firm, his or her acceptance is
consideration, and the first prong of the test is satisfied.
The examined cases were also unanimous in their assertion that when a
bonus or stock option was used to retain the services of one already employed,
the employee's remaining with the company was sufficient consideration to sup-
port the offer.217 The McMahon and Worth cases are in accord. In Worth the
court held that "[there] existed sufficient consideration to support the golden
parachute [because] ...UCB benefited from the retention of senior manage-
ment during a crisis period."2 8 McMahon likewise held that because the con-
tract's purpose was to retain McMahon during merger negotiations, his contin-
ued performance in an employment-at-will context constituted sufficient
consideration to validate the agreement.219 Finally, Buckhorn recognized that
golden parachutes designed to retain key employees who were at risk in a hos-
tile tender offer were a reasonable response to the perceived threat and were
therefore a valid corporate endeavor.220
The California court in Gaillard rejected the retention theory, however,
apparently because it believed that attraction and objectivity were the only pur-
poses to be served by a golden parachute.2 21 Yet a closer examination of the
context of that offering reveals that merger negotiations had already com-
menced when the contracts were issued.2 22 It is likely that the timing of the
offer created presumptions of self-dealing that were too great for the court to
214. E.g., Baher v. Penn-O-Tex Oil Corp., 258 Minn. 533, 539, 104 N.W.2d 661, 665 (1960).
215. Kerbs v. California E. Airways, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 69, 74, 90 A.2d 652, 656 (1952); Roberts v. Mays
Mills, 184 N.C. 406, 410-11, 114 S.E. 530, 532-33 (1922); Zwolanek v. Baker Mfg. Co., 150 Wis. 517, 522-24,
137 N.W. 769, 772-73 (1912).
216. 208 Cal. App. 3d 1250, 1266, 256 Cal. Rptr. 702, 712 (1989).
217. Kerbs, 33 Del. Ch. at 74, 90 A.2d at 656; Mays Mills, 184 N.C. at 412, 114 S.E. at 533.
218. Worth, No. 52861, slip op. at 45.
219. 183 Ga. App. at 545, 359 S.E.2d at 381.
220. Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209, 232 (S.D. Ohio), affid, 815 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1987).
221. 208 Cal. App. 3d at 1269-70, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
222. Id. at 1269, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
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ignore. The court's failure to treat retention as a valid purpose should not be
understood as a rejection of the validity of that concept, but rather as an en-
dorsement of fact-finding that is intolerant of fraud. If in the judgment of the
compensation committee, "ship jumping" is going to harm the corporation, any
reasonable means used to preserve the organization constitutes a valid exercise
of corporate power.
Crucial to this inquiry, however, is whether employment is terminable at
the will of either party, for a pre-existing written employment contract for a
term of years would establish an obligation for the employee to remain at work
regardless of any takeover activity. Absent a reformation of the contract, fully
disclosed and approved by shareholders, an offer of a golden parachute subse-
quent to a term employment contract would be void for lack of consideration.
This is to be distinguished from the situation in Koenings, where the golden
parachute and the written agreement, though offered subsequent to Koenings'
employment, were offered together as an integrated contract. The entire con-
tract was offered in the context of what was previously an employment-at-will
situation, so Koenings was obligated neither to accept the contract nor to re-
main with Schlitz. Such an offer satisfies the proposed test. Following this anal-
ysis, when a golden parachute retains one not otherwise obligated to remain, it
is supported by consideration.
2. Was the Award a Reasonable Forecast of Harm?
The inquiry for the stipulated damages cases was whether the amount stip-
ulated bore a reasonable relationship to the anticipated losses.2 3 Among the
factors considered were actual damages, subsequent earnings, consequential
damages, age, labor market, transferability of skills, and appropriate statutes.22'
Using these categories as a guide, the court is free to explore the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether the award is a reasonable forecast of harm
or whether it is so divergent from reasonable expectations that it would "seem
shockingly large. 2 25
The key inquiry will revolve around the reasonableness of the award, for
the Internal Revenue Code dictates that any amount shown to be "'reasonable
compensation for personal services actually rendered before the date of the
change'" will not be considered excessive compensation.22 Factors of probative
value will include "the work performed, the training and experience involved,
the results obtained, the need for unusual ability and talent, the inadequacy of
compensation in prior years, and the compensation paid by similar businesses
for comparable services. '' 227 These factors are not exhaustive, however, because
they address primarily performance-based indicia for executive parachutes.
Mid-level employees are perhaps the more frequent recipients of parachutes,
223. Layton Mfg. Co. v. Dulien Steel, Inc., 277 Or. 343, 347, 560 P.2d 1058, 1060 (1977); Koenings v.
Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 126 Wis. 2d 349, 363, 377 N.W.2d 593, 600-01 (1985).
224. See supra notes 21-30, 150-53 and accompanying text.
225. Kerbs v. California E. Airways, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 69, 78, 90 A.2d 652, 658 (1952).
226. Johnson, supra note 1, at 131 (quoting I.R.C. § 280G(b)(4)(B) (1986)).
227. Id. at 135.
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and these contracts are the most justifiable in terms of effective and reasonable
responses to threatened takeovers.22 In this context the courts should look at
the likelihood of the employee's departure, the probable impact upon the corpo-
ration of that departure, and the availability within the relevant labor market of
similarly skilled workers.
While this approach affords the court great latitude, it must be
remembered that the golden parachute is primarily a severance agreement,
designed to compensate displaced employees. It is "remuneration for the service
rendered"229 the corporation, and once performed, it accrues to the employee
and may not be voided unless it is unconscionable. Unconscionability will be
determined in light of current corporate practice and judicial treatment. The
liquidated damages analysis is merely a convenient tool facilitating judicial
inquiry.
3. Did the Contract Result from an Arms-Length Transaction?
To answer this question, the court need only examine the extent to which
the golden parachute was fully disclosed to voting shareholders, whether it re-
ceived their approval, and whether the amount and number of parachutes of-
fered constituted a reasonable response to a perceived threat. In the event the
challenge to the contract arises after a takeover has been consummated, the
question is whether the acquiring corporation ratified the contract at the time of
the merger. The stock option and golden parachute cases are unanimous in up-
holding contracts fully disclosed and ratified. While it may be argued that the
modern shareholder is frequently far removed from the actual operations of the
firm and is therefore ill equipped to render an informed decision, the law still
recognizes him or her as the final voice in corporate affairs. Though this concept
may be a fiction, it is the only yardstick available to measure disclosure.
4. Did the Consideration in Fact Accrue to the Corporation?
The central concern of the Kerbs court was that the contract, by either
explicit terms or trustworthy circumstances, guarantee that the corporation re-
ceive the consideration it sought.2 30 As already demonstrated, when validly ex-
ercised, golden parachutes necessarily promise full performance before execu-
tion is possible.23 1
The proper inquiry under this prong of the test is a factual one, focusing on
whether the change-of-control clause was properly triggered and whether the
228. If one is to accept the rationale that preservation of the corporate infrastructure is of paramount con-
cern in the face of a threatened takeover, then retaining key employees is as important, perhaps more so, as
retaining high-level executives. In Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., the court was persuaded that corporate survival
depended upon such continuity and upheld parachutes for employees other than the chief executive. 656 F. Supp.
209, 232 (S.D. Ohio), affid, 815 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1987). Worth and Koenings were also mid-level employees, and
those courts also endorsed their contracts. The golden parachute discussion, therefore, ought to include within its
scope treatment of this type of employee.
229. See supra text accompanying note 55.
230. Kerbs, 33 Del. Ch. at 74, 90 A.2d at 656.
231. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
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termination option specified material and verifiable reductions in job status or
responsibility. The test the court should apply is whether the objectively ascer-
tainable facts surrounding the alleged constructive termination support an infer-
ence that a diminution of job duties actually occurred. Following Worth,2 32 this
will be the focal point of a most intense scrutiny. Yet the proper focus, unlike
Worth, should be limited to whether or not a diminution in status or responsibil-
ity in fact took place. The subjective intent of the contract holder ought not to
be dispositive, nor should an honest, though mistaken, exercise of the termina-
tion clause bar recovery. The central inquiry is whether the employer has failed
to keep promises, implicit or explicit, that went to the basis of the bargain
struck between the parties. Good faith ought to be of probative value only in the
context of self-dealing and overreaching. Finally, the important concerns ex-
pressed regarding suboptimal mergers, acceleration of benefits, and corporate
entrenchment may be addressed in this part of the analysis, and the contract
may be voided if the executive's behavior fails to pass muster.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis has demonstrated that golden parachutes may be
analyzed in much the same way as are traditional employment and incentive
contracts. This analysis has avoided the ethical issues often cited in opposition
to golden parachutes because such arguments ignore the fact that under current
contract law, these agreements are valid and enforceable. In recognition of that
fact, it is best that courts adopt a uniform analysis that will penetrate and void
those agreements that in fact are wasteful or frivolously executed and uphold
those which are properly exercised.
Drew Harrison Campbell
232. Worth, No. 52861, slip op. at 11-38.
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